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“Right to Try” Legislation and Its Implications for the 
FDA Drug Approval Process 
Emily Hogan* 
INTRODUCTION 
Patrick Henry’s famous words, “Give me liberty, or give me 
death!”,1 have informed American political attitudes concerning civil 
liberties since this country’s founding.2 However, with substantial 
advancements in technology since Henry spoke these words in 1775, 
the contours of “liberty” have become increasingly more difficult to 
define.
3
 Particularly in the medical field, questions concerning the 
freedom of treatment constantly emerge with new discoveries and 
treatment options.
4
 One of these unanswered questions is whether 
terminally ill patients have the right to access treatments with 
potentially devastating risks when those treatments are their only 
chance of surviving.   
Take for example Angelina Fanous, who learned in the summer of 
2014 that she had amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS).
5
 She was 
 
 *  Emily Hogan, Washington University School of Law, Class of 2016. 
 1. WILLIAM WIRT, SKETCHES OF THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF PATRICK HENRY 123 
(1817).  
 2. J. David Bleich, Is There a Right to Physician-Assisted Suicide?, 24 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 795, 797–98 (1997). 
 3. Charles L. Cohen, The “Liberty or Death” Speech: A Note on Religion and 
Revolutionary Rhetoric, 38 WM. & MARY Q. 702, 702 (1981). 
 4. For example, physician-assisted suicide is sometimes considered a civil liberty. See 
Bleich, supra note 2. More recently, the Connecticut Supreme Court ordered a seventeen-year-
old teen to undergo chemotherapy to treat Hodgkin’s Disease after she rejected the treatment. 
The teen argued against the ruling, claiming that she has “the right to make [her own] medical 
decisions.” Samantha Masunaga, Connecticut Teen Fighting State Justices’ Ruling on Forced 
Chemotherapy, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-teen-chemo-
20150111-story.html. 
 5. Angelina Fanous, For A.L.S. Patients, a Hopeful Drug That Is Out of Reach, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 5, 2015), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/02/05/for-a-l-s-patients-a-hopeful-
drug-thats-out-of-reach/. 
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twenty-nine years old.
6
 Angelina claims that a medication currently 
being tested to treat ALS, called GM6, has been effective in slowing 
the advancement of the disease in its test subjects.
7
 She argues that 
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) should act to allow 
the thousands of people suffering from ALS to access the drug, 
noting, “I’m dying slowly and painfully and young, and I’m willing 
to take the risk.”8 Other compelling personal anecdotes like 
Angelina’s suggest that terminally ill individuals desire the ability to 
try experimental drugs to preserve their own lives in any way 
possible;
9
 however, the FDA’s intensive drug approval process10 and 
its restrictions on accessing experimental drugs
11
 suggest that the 
government perceives the potential deadly risks as too great, even for 
the terminally ill. 
Complicating this debate is the fact that the FDA can take up to 
fifteen years to approve an investigational drug like GM6 and put it 
on the market.
12
 In response to critics of this lengthy approval 
process, the FDA has enacted initiatives to help individuals who 
would benefit from experimental drugs access them more quickly.
13
 
Several programs, like the “fast track” approach, accelerate the drug 
approval process, allowing drugs to be out on the market sooner.
14
 
Another program, called “expanded access,” permits limited 
exceptions to the restrictions on accessing experimental drugs, as 
long as the terminally ill patient meets specific criteria.
15
  
 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id.  
 8. Id.  
 9. For example, two Americans who contracted Ebola in 2014 consented to use of the 
drug ZMapp, which had not yet been tested on humans.  Sanjay Gupta & Danielle Dellorto, 
Experimental Drug Likely Saved Ebola Patients, CNN (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2014/08/04/health/experimental-ebola-serum/. It is believed that this drug prevented them from 
dying of the disease. Id. 
 10. FDA: Drug Approval Process, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/ downloads/Drugs/ 
ResourcesForYou/Consumers/UCM284393.pdf (last accessed Mar. 8, 2016). 
 11. Expanded Access: Information for Patients, FDA (Mar. 3, 2016),  http://www.fda.gov/ 
ForPatients/Other/ExpandedAccess/ucm20041768.htm. 
 12. PhRMA Profile 2013, PHRMA (July 2013), http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/ 
files/pdf/PhRMA %20Profile%202013.pdf. 
 13. Fast Track, Breakthrough Therapy, Accelerated Approval, Priority Review, FDA 
(Sept. 14, 2015),  http://www.fda.gov/forpatients/approvals/fast/default.htm. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Expanded Access: Information for Patients, supra note 11.  
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Even though these two measures allow patients quicker access to 
drugs, some still feel that these measures give the terminally ill 
insufficient time to save their own lives.
16
 In response, several state 
legislatures have enacted “right to try” laws that allow terminally ill 
patients to access experimental drugs directly from drug companies 
and without full FDA approval.
17
 The hope is that by eliminating the 
bureaucratic oversight of the federal entity, patients can access drugs 
more easily and have a better chance at survival.
18
  
This Note will provide an in-depth analysis of the realistic 
implications of these “right to try” laws and provide 
recommendations on addressing their most problematic 
consequences. To begin, Part I provides background information on 
the regulation of drugs in the United States. Specifically, Part I.A 
discusses the history of federal food and drug regulations from 1848 
until the present day. Part I.B outlines in depth the current procedure 
that manufacturers must follow for the FDA to approve a new drug, 
including specific programs designed to accelerate the approval 
process. Part I.C describes the various options a terminally ill patient 
has to access an experimental drug under the FDA’s regulations. Part 
I.D then discusses various attempts to circumvent these regulations, 
including recent “right to try” legislation.  
Part II analyzes the limitations that terminally ill patients face in 
accessing investigational treatments and “right to try” laws 
themselves, arguing that these laws fail to actually help the terminally 
ill access experimental drugs more quickly, create problems for 
medical providers and drug companies producing experimental 
medications, and are easily preempted by extensive federal 
regulations that address the topic. Finally, Part III suggests that, 
although these state laws are problematic in their current form, the 
FDA should recognize that they reflect a public desire to relax 
regulatory standards for the terminally ill and streamline the 
“expanded access” process to allow more individuals to access 
 
 16. See, e.g., Starlee Coleman, Michigan Becomes Fourth State to Adopt ‘Right to Try’ 
Law, GOLDWATER INST. (Oct. 17, 2014), http://goldwaterinstitute.org/en/work/topics/ healthcare/ 
right-to-try/michigan-becomes-fourth-state-to-adopt-right-to-tr. (noting that the “‘Compassionate 
Use’ process takes more than one hundred hours of paperwork and months to navigate”).  
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
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experimental drugs in their time of need. Moreover, Part III proposes 
that the FDA make a concerted effort to educate physicians on its 
“expanded access” procedures, so that patients will have informed 
medical care providers who can help them navigate the complex 
federal regulations. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The History of U.S. Regulation of Food and Drugs 
The United States first began monitoring food and drugs in 1848, 
yet it did not enjoy the expansive regulatory authority it now 
exercises until nearly sixty years later.
19
 These increased regulatory 
functions were enacted in response to the American people voicing 
growing concerns about the adulteration of various foods when a 
designated branch of the Department of Agriculture, the Bureau of 
Chemistry, expanded its focus from regulating agricultural products 
to include overseeing food and drug research.
20
 
As the American people became more informed about the realities 
of non-regulation of the food and drug industries throughout the 
nineteenth century, public demand for heightened monitoring grew.
21
 
 
 19. About FDA: History, FDA (Mar. 3, 2015), http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo/ 
history/default.htm. 
 20. James Robert Dean, Jr., FDA at War: Securing the Food That Secured Victory, 53 
FOOD DRUG L.J. 453, 455 (1998). See also Sharon B. Jacobs, Crises, Congress, and Cognitive 
Biases: A Critical Examination of Food and Drug Legislation in the United States, 64 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 599 (2009). The growing concerns led to Congress passing the Biologics Control 
Act in 1902, which ordered all biologic products sold in the country to receive federal licenses 
in order to regulate the growing field of medicinal bacteria. Id. at 601. The passage of the 
Biologics Control Act followed a 1901 incident where thirteen children, after receiving 
diphtheria antitoxin shots produced from the blood of horses, died after the shots proved to be 
contaminated with tetanus spores. A Short History of the National Institute of Health: Biologics, 
NAT’L INST. HEALTH, http://history.nih.gov/exhibits/history/docs/page_03.html (last accessed 
Mar. 11, 2016).  
 21. Arlene Finger Kantor, Upton Sinclair and the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, 66 
AMER. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 1202, 1202–05 (1976). Before the nineteenth century, many states 
had laws regulating the production and distribution of food, but they were “markedly 
inconsistent from state to state.” John P. Swann, About FDA: FDA’s Origin, FDA (June 23, 
2014), http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm124403.htm.   
 Moreover, the way that many states’ laws were structured, companies could manufacture 
adulterated products, but as long as they were sold in other states, the companies could not be 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol50/iss1/8
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First, certain interest groups in the United States expressed their 
opinions on federal legislation aimed at purifying these industries.
22
 
Additionally, the popularity of Upton Sinclair’s provocative novel 
The Jungle, an exposé of the realities of the Chicago meat packing 
industry,
23
 accompanied by the Department of Agriculture’s chief 
chemist Harvey W. Wiley’s activism24 and the work of other 
journalists,
25
 provided the public with reliable information about the 
detrimental effects of drug and food contamination. This information 
outraged the public and fueled the increase of demands for 
heightened oversight.
26
 
 
prosecuted. C. C. Regier, The Struggle for Federal Food and Drugs Legislation, 1 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 10 (1933). 
 22. For example, meat packers, like other food industrialists, exploited immigrant labor 
and unsanitary manufacturing techniques to mass produce meat and keep costs down; so to 
them, regulation meant higher costs. Illinois History: Packingtown, ILL. STATE UNIV., 
http://history.illinoisstate.edu/downloads/Vignette_Packingtown_.pdf (last accessed Mar. 11, 
2016). 
 23. Kantor, supra note 21, at 1203. Sinclair, a socialist writer concerned with the “wage 
slavery” prevalent in food production industries, published The Jungle in 1906. Id. The book 
details the life of a Lithuanian immigrant who works in the meat-packing industry in early 
1900s Chicago. UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (1906). The book exposes some of the truly 
terrible working conditions that poor immigrants working in the industry experienced and the 
unregulated, unsanitary factories where much of the country’s food was manufactured. Id. 
Interestingly, Sinclair wrote the book as socialist propaganda and to comment on the treatment 
of poor immigrants, but the public was outraged only by the reports on unclean meat. Regier, 
supra note 21, at 9.  
 Sinclair responded by noting, “I aimed at the public’s heart, and by accident I hit it in the 
stomach.” Upton Sinclair, What Life Means to Me, COSMOPOLITAN MAG., Oct. 31, 1906, at 
591, 594. 
 24. Kantor, supra note 21, at 1202; see also Jacobs, supra note 20, at 601; Dean, supra 
note 20, at 455. Wiley spent years publicly advocating for increased federal regulation of the 
food and drug industries and sparked public outcry after publicizing an experiment showing the 
negative effects of consuming contaminated food. Kantor, supra note 21, at 1202. 
 25. In addition to Wiley and Sinclair, writers Edward Bok and Mark Sullivan of The 
Ladies Home Journal and Samuel Hopkins Adams of Collier’s Weekly embraced muckraking 
journalism techniques to expose the need for drug regulation. Regier, supra note 21, at 7. In his 
description of the pre-1906 conditions of the drug industry, Adams noted: “Floods of potions, 
avalanches of pills and powders, had been pouring out from the various nostrum shops, without 
let or hindrance, to overflow the land. Seventy-five million dollars a year is a moderate estimate 
of the volume of business done by pseudo-medical preparations which ‘eradicated’ asthma with 
sugar and water, ‘soothed’ babies with concealed and deadly opiates, ‘relieved’ headaches 
through the agency of dangerous, heart-impairing, coal-tar drugs, ‘dispelled’ catarrh by cocaine 
mixture, enticing to a habit worse than death’s very self, and ‘cured’ tuberculosis, cancer, and 
Bright’s disease with disguised and flavored whiskies and gins.” Id. 
 26.  Kantor, supra note 21, at 1205.  
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Such demands ultimately spurred federal action. Congress 
responded to the public outrage by passing the Food and Drugs Act 
of 1906, criminalizing the manufacture or sale of “food or drug which 
is adulterated or misbranded” and authorizing the Department of 
Agriculture, among other departments, to create regulations to 
enforce the Act’s mission and inspect potentially adulterated or 
misbranded items.
27
 Though the Act was the first to give regulatory 
authority to the federal government, Congress passed the legislation 
only after serious compromise;
28
 thus, the “poorly constructed” Act 
contained substantial flaws.
29
 In fact, during the subsequent three 
decades, both Congress and the courts wrestled with details of the 
1906 Food and Drug Act; however, these problems did not hinder the 
Bureau of Chemistry from greatly expanding their influence in food 
and drug regulation.
30
 
 
 27. Pure Food (Wiley) Act, Pub. L. No.  59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906). Interestingly, the 
Act had an exception for the definition of “adulterated” which noted that “no drug defined in 
the United States Pharmacapœia or National Formulary shall be deemed to be adulterated under 
this provision if the standard of strength, quality, or purity be plainly stated upon the bottle, 
box, or other container. . . .” Wiley Act § 7.  As can be seen, the Act’s definition of adulterated 
aimed more at misbranding than at actual adulteration of food and drugs. Juan Joel Tovanche, 
Dying to Wait: How the Abigail Court Got It Wrong, 22 J.L. & HEALTH 53, 81–82 (2009).   
 28. Ilyse Barkan writes that before the passage of the 1906 Act, even “[e]loquent exposés 
of industrial horrors and paternalistic tendencies of the federal government could not force a 
Congress dominated by special interests to enact laws that those interests did not want.” Ilyse 
D. Barkan, Industry Invites Regulation: The Passage of the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, 
75:1 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 18 (1985). She notes that between 1879 and 1906, over two hundred 
legislative proposals were introduced in Congress and promptly rejected, showing that serious 
conflicts of interests prevented the Houses from reaching an agreement for a long time. Id. 
 29. James T. O’Reilly, The Food and Drug Administration: A Brief History, 1 U.S. FOOD 
& DRUG ADMIN. § 3:3 (2014). Specifically, the fact that regulations under the Act had to be 
approved by the Treasury, Agriculture, and Commerce Departments meant that new regulations 
were infrequently passed and diluted when they were approved. Id. Moreover, the Act 
specifically defined the standards for drug regulation but was less specific about the standards 
for food, leading to confusion and many legal disputes. Id. See also FDA History—Part I: The 
1906 Food and Drugs Act and Its Enforcement, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/ 
WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm054819.htm (last updated June 18, 2009). As the 1906 law did 
not define “adulterated” and “misbranded” well, courts determined violations on a case-by-case 
basis, making the act a “legal, as opposed to administrative, regime.” Dean, supra note 20, at 
456. For example, in 1909, the government seized forty barrels and twenty kegs of Coca-Cola 
under the Act, claiming that the caffeine added to the beverage was a harmful additive. Ludy T. 
Benjamin, Pop Psychology: The Man Who Saved Coca-Cola, 40 AMER. PSYCHOL. ASS’N 18 
(2009).  
 30. FDA History—Part I, supra note 29; see also Benjamin, supra note 29.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol50/iss1/8
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The Bureau of Chemistry, which eventually became the present 
day FDA,
31
 changed drastically with the passage of the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act in 1938.
32
 The Act, among other things,
33
 
mandated that all new drugs be approved for safety by the 
administration before they could be marketed.
34
 The Act also allowed 
the FDA to promulgate its own regulations, laws, and definitions 
without seeking approval from other departments.
35
 A 1962 
amendment, the Drug Efficacy Amendment, created a general 
 
 31. See Swann, supra note 21. The Bureau of Chemistry was renamed the Food, Drug, 
and Insecticide Administration after its “non-regulatory research functions” were moved to 
another part of the Department of Agriculture in 1927 and was eventually shortened to the 
present day Food and Drug Administration in 1930. Id. 
 32. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) 
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2012)). 
 This law superseded the 1906 Food and Drugs Act. Id. § 902(a). Congress enacted this law 
following review of the significant flaws of the previous legislation and after a particular 
“wonder drug” poisoned and killed over one hundred people with antifreeze. FDA History—
Part II: The 1938 Food, Drugs, and Cosmetic Act, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/ 
AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm054826.htm (last updated Sept. 24, 2012). 
Specifically, the drug company S.E. Massengilll Co. developed a new, liquid version of their 
wonder drug, Sulfanilamide, that “successfully passed all tests for flavor, appearance, and 
fragrance.” BENJAMIN ROSSEN, FDA’S PROPOSED REGULATIONS TO EXPAND ACCESS TO 
INVESTIGATIONAL DRUGS FOR TREATMENT USE: THE STATUS QUO IN THE GUISE OF REFORM 6 
(2008), available at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:8965551. Under the 1906 Act 
regulations, the company had no responsibility to check for toxicity in their products; thus, only 
after their new medication, the “equivalent of modern day antifreeze,” killed people across the 
nation did it become clear that the medication was poisonous. Id. As is common in food and 
drug regulations, Congress finally enacted stricter guidelines following this public health crisis. 
Id. at 6–7. 
 33. The law expanded the FDA’s administrative scope to include medical devices and 
cosmetics, added much-needed definitions of food items, and allowed for factory inspections. 
See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 301.  
 34. Id.; see also Jacobs, supra note 20, at 602, 607.  This Act defines “drug” as 
“(A) articles recognized in the official United States Pharmacopoeia, official Homoeopathic 
Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or official National Formulary, or any supplement to any 
of them; and (B) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or 
prevention of disease in man or other animals; and (C) articles (other than food) intended to 
affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals; and (D) articles 
intended for use as a component of any article specified in clause (A), (B), or (C).” § 321(g)(1). 
Interestingly, there is no exception clause, showing that this new law focused more heavily on 
the safety of drugs than on the Act that it replaced. See Tovanche, supra note 27, at 83; 
ROSSEN, supra note 32, at 7. Later, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act’s approval 
process led to an amendment in 1951 introducing the idea of “prescriptions drugs” that could 
only be administered under supervision. Durham-Humphrey Act, 65 Stat. 648 (1951). Before 
1951, non-narcotic drugs were commonly accessible in a pharmacy without doctor approval. 
Peter Temin, The Origin of Compulsory Drug Prescriptions, 22 J.L. & ECON. 91 (1979). 
 35. Dean, supra note 20, at 457. 
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standard for the drug approval process, requiring that each new drug 
be proved safe and effective.
36
 Today, “safe and effective” remains 
the standard that new drugs must meet for FDA approval.
37
 
Currently the FDA, now housed in the Department of Health and 
Human Services, oversees goods accounting for twenty cents of 
every dollar
38
 spent by consumers in the United States and employs 
over fifteen thousand “chemists, pharmacologists, physicians, 
microbiologists, veterinarians, pharmacists, lawyers, and many 
others.”39 As evidence of its great expansion of regulation, the FDA’s 
drug approval process has become extremely complex, with four 
different levels of testing, multiple applications, and strict labeling, 
manufacturing, and marketing guidelines.
40
 As described in Section 
II, the drug approval process, created to ensure that only the highest 
quality drugs are marketed to the public, also comes at a cost. 
B. FDA Drug Approval Process 
Before the FDA can begin to review and test an application for a 
new drug, a pharmaceutical company or other drug sponsor must 
create a compound that it hopes to market.
41
 The drug company must 
first test the drug on animals for at least two and a half years to 
record the toxicity of the drug and potential side effects.
42
 Following 
 
 36. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 102, 76 Stat. 780, 781–82 (1962). 
“Section 201(p)(1) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1)), 
defining the term ‘new drug,’ is amended by (A) inserting therein, immediately after the words 
‘to evaluate the safety,’ the words ‘and effectiveness,’ and (B) inserting therein, immediately 
after the words ‘as safe,’ the words ‘and effective.’” Id. 
 37. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
 38. The FDA is responsible for “most food products (other than meat and poultry), human 
and animal drugs, therapeutic agents of biological origin, medical devices, radiation-emitting 
products for consumer, medical, and occupational use, cosmetics, and animal feed.” Swann, 
supra note 21.  
 39. Id.  The FDA’s 2014 budget was $4.4 million, when it monitored over $1 trillion in 
products. Id. 
 40. FDA: Drug Approval Process, supra note 10. 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. See also Melissa Marie Bean, Fatal Flaws in the Food and Drug Administration’s 
Drug-Approval Formula, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 881, 884 (2003). However, sometimes, in order 
to properly identify the chemicals being used and gather enough evidence of sufficient safety to 
move on to human trials, the animal testing process can take around three and a half years, 
which occurs prior to even submitting the Investigational New Drug application. See ROSSEN, 
supra note 32, at 10.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol50/iss1/8
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animal testing, a company must file an initial Investigational New 
Drug Application with the FDA, requesting approval for human 
testing.
43
 After this initial application, three phases of human trials 
must be successfully completed before the FDA will approve a new 
drug.
44
 The three phases range from using a sample of less than one 
hundred humans in Phase I to testing on thousands in Phase III.
45
 
Following the human trials, the drug company must file a New Drug 
Application, giving detailed information regarding the composition of 
the drug, potential labeling, the step-by-step manufacturing process, 
research on the drug’s safety and efficacy gathered from the animal 
testing, and the drug’s patent information.46 Subsequently, the FDA 
has 180 days
47
 to either make a decision on the drug or defer the 
adjudication on its application to a later date.
48
 
This stringent approval process,
49
 though historically known for 
its efficiency in weeding out harmful drugs,
50
 is accompanied by 
 
 43. Bean, supra note 42, at 884. 
 44. FDA: Drug Approval Process, supra note 10. Phase I experiments are usually 
conducted on healthy individuals and test for unacceptable toxicity. Phase II and III 
experiments are then conducted on individuals with the addressed ailment. Thus, Phase I tests 
mainly address a drug’s safety, while subsequent tests address a drug’s effectiveness. The 
FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Effective, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/ucm143534.htm last accessed Mar. 14, 
2016) [hereinafter The FDA’s Drug Review Process]. A drug will only proceed to Phase III 
testing if the results of Phases I and II “offer a reasonable assurance that the drug is effective 
and safe, and that the potential benefits of the drug outweigh the risks of a large-scale clinical 
trial.” See ROSSEN, supra note 32, at 11. Because Phase III attempts to find the best “dose-
response relationship” and records the most common side effects, it is usually the longest and 
most intense, often lasting up to three years. Id. at 11–12.   
 45. See ROSSEN, supra note 32, at 11–12. 
 46. Bean, supra note 42, at 884–85; 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1938). 
 47. The FDA circumvents this required timeframe by using questionable logic; the 
administration will sometimes say that a New Drug Application has not been “filed” until it is 
approvable. See ROSSEN, supra note 32, at 12.  
 48. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c).  
 49. During the drug approval process, the FDA scrutinizes everything “from the design of 
clinical trials to the severity of side effects to the conditions under which the drug is 
manufactured” in order to guarantee that the drug is truly safe and effective. The FDA’s Drug 
Review Process, supra note 44. 
 50. In the 1950s and 1960s, Gruenenthal, a German drug company, began marketing 
Thalidomide worldwide as a “wonder drug” that, among other things, effectively treated 
pregnant women’s morning sickness. However, the drug eventually led to thousand of physical 
and mental birth defects. See Thalidomide: The Canadian Tragedy, THALOMIDE VICTIM’S 
ASS’N OF CANADA, http://www.thalidomide.ca/the-canadian-tragedy (last visited Oct. 28, 
2015); Jacobs, supra note 20, at 611.  The drug was unavailable in the United States, as the 
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serious issues in the development of new treatments and the standard 
of care in the United States. First, it takes a drug manufacturer 
anywhere between ten and fifteen years to get a new drug approved 
by the FDA.
51
 The FDA claims that these years of testing are 
necessary to properly dispel concerns of a drug’s safety and efficacy 
and fears of approving a drug that could have serious adverse 
consequences in the future.
52
 Moreover, the estimated cost of 
research and development for a new drug is estimated to cost 
between $4 and $11 billion.
53
 This price tag, combined with the 
extraordinary time needed for approval, means that relatively few 
drugs get approved every year.
54
 Even for drugs that do get approved, 
drug companies must recoup these high costs, and consequently, 
patients who need these treatments bear the burden of covering 
them.
55
 Finally, many drugs developed overseas are not marketed in 
the United States because the cost of obtaining FDA approval 
exceeds projected revenues.
56
 As a result, many potentially beneficial 
foreign treatment options are unavailable in America.
57
  
In response to growing criticism of the FDA’s approval process 
for new drugs,
58
 Congress implemented a “fast track” program 
 
FDA refused to approve it. Bean, supra note 42, at 883.  This decision earned the FDA a 
“sterling reputation” as an effective consumer protection organization. Id. This “near miss” was 
the impetus for the 1962 Drug Amendments that added an efficacy requirement before FDA 
approval. See ROSSEN, supra note 32, at 8; see also FDA History—Part I, supra note 29; and 
Benjamin, supra note 29 for more information on the amendments.  
 51. PhRMA Profile 2013, supra note 12. 
 52. Dale H. Gieringer, The Safety and Efficacy of New Drug Approval, 5:1 CATO J. 177 
(1985). Gieringer argues that the “safety” and “efficacy” standards should not be applied with 
society-wide standards, as these ideas are subjective and depend on an individual’s 
characteristics. Id. at 180.  
 53. Mathew Herper, The Truly Staggering Cost of Inventing New Drugs, FORBES (Feb. 
10, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2012/02/10/the-truly-staggering-cost-of-
inventing-new-drugs/print/. Less than one in ten drugs succeed in the trial phase, so the cost of 
failure can be steep. Id. 
 54. The FDA’s Drug Review Process, supra note 44. The FDA approved thirty-nine new 
drugs in 2012, the most in fifteen years. Barry Werth, A Tale of Two Drugs, MIT TECH. REV. 
(Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.technologyreview.com/featuredstory/520441/a-tale-of-two-drugs/.  
 55. Werth, supra note 54. 
 56. Gieringer, supra note 52 at 179. Drugs that are available in other countries but not the 
United States are sometimes referred to as “orphan drugs.” Id. 
 57. Amelia A. Esber, Note, Curing the Drug Lag: A Proposal for International 
Harmonization of Pharmaceutical Approval, 31 ARIZ. J. INT’L COMP. L. 125, 132 (2014).  
 58. For example, the rise of the AIDS epidemic in the United States and the inevitability 
of death due to a lack of treatment options prompted many people suffering from the illness to 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol50/iss1/8
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whereby drugs for “serious or life-threatening illnesses and that 
provide meaningful therapeutic benefit to patients over existing 
treatments” can be approved more quickly.59 Congress codified this 
process and several others by passing the Food and Drug 
Administration Modernization Act of 1997, still in effect today.
60
 The 
Act allows for faster approval if the drug is truly needed to advance 
medical treatment for certain illnesses.
61
 Currently, the FDA has four 
different expedited processes for reviewing potentially life-saving 
drugs:
62
 (1) the fast track approach, which covers drugs that “fill an 
unmet medical need;” (2) the breakthrough therapy approach, which 
addresses therapies that could be significantly more effective than 
existing ones; (3) the accelerated approval approach, which allows 
for certain drugs to be approved if some evidence of a future clinical 
benefit is met; and (4) the priority review approach, which covers 
FDA plans to make a decision on a specific drug within six months.
63
 
Section III discusses circumstances where individuals who require 
these drugs to battle a terminal illness may access drugs even before 
their approval for sale to the public.  
 
protest the “paternalistic and risk-averse procedures for FDA drug approval.” Michael D. 
Greenberg, AIDS, Experimental Drug Approval, and the FDA New Drug Screening Process, 3 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 295, 296 (2000). An organized political movement eventually 
convinced the FDA to relax its standards for treatment and allow the patients themselves to 
determine the acceptable risks of taking certain medications. Id. at 296–97.  
 59. Bean, supra note 42, at 886; David Willman, How a New Policy Led to Seven Deadly 
Drugs, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2000), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-122001fda-story.html# 
page=1; 21 C.F.R. § 314.500 (2001). 
 60. Bean, supra note 42, at 887; Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 
1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 112, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997). 
 61. 21 U.S.C. § 356 (2012). 
 62. For Patients: Fast Track, supra note 13. 
 63. Id. Generally, drug companies push for their drugs to be reviewed in an accelerated 
process because they want to quickly recoup the large amounts of money invested in 
developing the drug. Bean, supra note 42, at 887. However, though these processes are useful 
in putting drugs on the market faster, the increase in drug companies seeking a faster approval 
time has led to speculation that some drugs may not be fully vetted before their approval. 
Colleen Curry, Fast-Track FDA Approval for Big Drug Companies Might Be a Bad Thing, 
VICE NEWS (Sept. 25, 2015), https://news.vice.com/article/fast-track-fda-approval-for-big-drug-
companies-might-be-a-bad-thing. 
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C. Experimental Drug Access Through the FDA 
Despite these fast track approval methods, for many patients 
suffering from terminal illness, the process is still too long for the 
potentially life-saving therapies to benefit them. Currently, terminally 
ill patients have two ways in which they can access new drugs before 
they are approved and marketed nationwide.
64
  
Their first option is to be selected to participate in one of the 
clinical trials required for FDA approval.
65
 However, participation in 
a clinical trial carries several risks. First, a potential participant must 
meet certain criteria regarding the condition of their ailment and other 
requirements that the researchers identify.
66
 Moreover, Phase II and 
Phase III trials often employ control groups who are given placebos, 
so participants using a clinical trial to receive potentially life-saving 
medications may not actually be receiving the medicines.
67
 In all, less 
than 3 percent of terminally ill patients have access to experimental 
drugs through a clinical trial, making it a difficult path to pursue for 
most of these patients.
68
  
The second way to access experimental drugs is through an FDA 
program called “Expanded Access” or “Compassionate Use.”69 This 
program allows individuals with life-threatening diseases to access 
drugs and medical devices that have passed the early stages of 
clinical trials.
70
 The requirements for access through this program are 
rather stringent: a potential participant must prove that they are 
suffering from a life-threatening disease and that no reasonable 
 
 64. Learn About Expanded Access and Other Treatment Options, FDA, http://www.fda. 
gov/ForPatients/Other/default.htm (last updated Feb. 2, 2016). 
 65. U.S. NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, Learn About Clinical Studies, CLINICALTRIALS (Dec. 
2014), https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/about-studies/learn. 
 66. Id. Researchers typically want a wide range of people represented in their study’s 
group, so as to guarantee that the results are the least biased possible. See Drugs: Inside 
Clinical Trials: Testing Medical Products in People, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ 
ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm143531.htm (last updated Nov. 6, 2014). 
 67. Drugs: Inside Clinical Trials, supra note 66. 
 68. Mary Lou Byrd, Third State Passes ‘Right to Try’ Legislation, WASH. FREE BEACON, 
(July 17, 2014), http://freebeacon.com/issues/third-state-passes-right-to-try-legislation/.  
 69. For Patients: Understanding Expanded Access, supra note 11. 
 70. Id. See also 21 C.F.R. § 312.305 (2009). 
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alternative treatment exists, including clinical trials.
71
 Moreover, the 
FDA suggests that applicants take several proactive measures, such 
as searching for expanded access programs online, contacting drug 
companies themselves to inquire about their policies, contacting 
patient advocacy groups about group programs they may have, and 
finding a physician willing to oversee the treatment before they can 
access the drugs.
72
 Also, physicians must follow stringent 
requirements during the application process and afterward, including 
reviewing all potential risks and benefits of a drug, completing hours 
of paperwork, working with an Institutional Review Board at their 
place of work, and monitoring the patient for the entire treatment 
period.
73
 All in all, roughly one thousand people participate in this 
program per year,
74
 and a drug company must agree to give their 
drugs to the individuals,
75
 even after the FDA grants the exception.
76
 
 
 71. 21 C.F.R. § 312.305; For Patients: Understanding Expanded Access, supra note 11. 
The FDA considers factors such as: the likelihood that death will occur, or will occur 
prematurely, without the experimental medication; if there is a “comparable or satisfactory 
alternative therapy” to treat the patient; the risks of using and not using the treatment; and the 
effects of allowing access on clinical studies of the drug. For Patients: Understanding 
Expanded Access, supra note 11. 
 72. For Patients: Understanding Expanded Access, supra note 11. As many patients will 
not have the knowledge or resources to learn what experimental drugs are being tested, 
applicants will have to complete extensive research in order to find a potentially helpful drug in 
development.  
 73. Expanding Access: Information for Physicians, FDA (Dec. 15, 2013), 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/PublicHealthFocus/ExpandedAccessCompassionateUse/ucm4
29624.htm; see also Kimberly Leonard, Seeking the Right to Try, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/11/18/right-to-try-laws-
allowing-patients-to-try-experimental-drugs-bypass-fda (noting that it can take doctors up to 
one hundred hours to complete the requisite paperwork). 
 74. Not much evidence exists of the experiences of those who have participated in the 
program, and the number of people rejected from the “compassionate use” program is not 
published. However, the FDA has said that it approves nearly 99 percent of applications. 
Elizabeth Cohen, Dying Patients Denied Drugs, CNN (Apr. 6, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2014/04/05/health/cohen-compassionate-use/. Also, the FDA usually defers to a drug 
company’s decision to grant access to one of its experimental drugs. Stephanie Baum, NYU 
Prof: Right to Try Laws Will Not Get Experimental Drugs to the Sick People Who Need Them, 
MEDCITY NEWS (Dec. 22, 2014), http://medcitynews.com/2014/12/fdas-compassionate-use-
process-needs-efficient-beats-right-beg-laws-pased-states/.  
 75. Even if the FDA allows the compassionate use and the drug company is wiling to 
provide the treatments, many of the drugs, if not provided gratuitously by the drug 
manufacturers, will not be covered by insurance and therefore may still be unaffordable. Baum, 
supra note 74. 
 76. See John Tozzi, Do Dying Patients Have a Right to Try Experimental Drugs? 
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Thus, accessing these drugs can still be an extraordinary burden of 
time and effort for a terminally ill individual.
77
  
D. Responses to Experimental Drug Access Procedure 
In response to the overwhelming time and effort that drug 
companies spend developing drugs along with the difficulty in 
accessing experimental drugs through clinical trials and FDA 
accelerated programs, several entities have taken action to fight for 
more liberal access to these drugs.
78
 For example, in November 2001, 
Frank Burroughs, whose daughter Abigail died from squamous cell 
carcinoma earlier that year,
79
 founded an organization on her behalf 
called the Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental 
Drugs (Abigail Alliance).
80
 Before she died, Abigail, her family, and 
her oncologist unsuccessfully petitioned the FDA and certain 
Congressmen
81
 for access to Erbitux or Iressa, two investigational 
drugs recommended by her oncologist to address her terminal, 
 
Libertarians Say Yes, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/ 
articles/2014-08-21/do-dying-patients-have-a-right-to-try-experimental-drugs-libertarians-say-
yes; Factsheet: Access to Investigational Drugs, NAT’L CANCER INST. (Aug. 4, 2009), 
http://www.cancer.gov/ about-cancer/treatment/drugs/investigational-drug-access-fact-sheet. 
 77. On average, the FDA receives around one thousand applications a year and approved 
almost all of them. Kardish, infra note 116.  
 78. See Lewis A. Grossman, The Origins of American Health Libertarianism, 13 YALE J. 
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 76, 81 (2013). 
 79. Kate Gilchrist & Sara Love Swaney, A Right to Access Unapproved Experimental 
Drugs? Abigail Alliance Battles the FDA for a New Constitutional Right, MISS. MED. NEWS, 
May 2007, at 17, available at http://arwebserver.arlaw.com/pdf/MississippiMedicalNews 
0507.pdf.  
 80. See Frank Burroughs, Our Story, ABIGAIL ALLIANCE, http://www.abigail-
alliance.org/story.php (last accessed Mar. 16, 2016); Sue Kovach, The Abigail Alliance, LIFE 
EXTENSION MAG., Sept. 2007, at 67, available at http://www.lifeextension.com/magazine/ 
2007/9/report_abigail/page-01.  
 The mission of the Abigail Alliance includes “helping [to] create wider access to 
developmental cancer drugs and other drugs for serious life-threatening illnesses,” “promoting 
creative ways of increasing expanded access and compassionate use programs,” and “helping 
better inform cancer patients, other patients, and their doctors about the website, 
clinicaltrials.gov.” The Abigail Alliance Mission, ABIGAIL ALLIANCE, http://www.abigail-
alliance.org/mission.php (last visited Jan. 3, 2016).  
 81. Abigail and her family launched a media campaign to bring awareness to her fight for 
these investigational drugs and to influence the FDA and Congress to consider her cause; 
Abigail participated in several newspaper and television interviews throughout her battle with 
cancer. Burroughs, supra note 80.   
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otherwise untreatable illness.
82
 In 2003, the Abigail Alliance finally 
took legal action and submitted a petition to the FDA proposing new 
guidelines for terminally ill patients trying to access experimental 
drugs.
83
 The FDA responded to the Abigail Alliance by letter, 
explaining why their proposals could not be implemented and noting 
that allowing earlier access could frustrate their goal of guaranteeing 
that drugs be safe and effective for public use.
84
 Nevertheless, the 
Abigail Alliance subsequently submitted a citizen’s petition, but the 
FDA failed to respond, prompting the Abigail Alliance to file a claim 
against the FDA in federal court.
85
 
 
 82. Erbitux is the brand name for cetuximab, a drug now approved by the FDA to treat 
colo-rectal cancer that has spread to other parts of the body. ERBITUX, http://www.erbitux.com 
(last updated Sept. 2015). 
 Iressa is the brand name for genfitinib, a drug that targets epidermal growth factor 
receptors, common in “non-small cell lung cancer.” IRESSA, http://www.iressa.com (last 
updated July 2015). Abigail’s oncologist thought that these drugs would treat her tumor, as it 
“was rich in epidermal growth factor receptors” and the two new drugs worked to inhibit these 
receptors. See Gilchrist, supra note 79. Abigail, however, was denied these treatments. The 
FDA denied Iressa because Abigail did not qualify for the drug’s clinical trials, and it denied 
Erbitux because that drug’s intended target was colon cancer, not Abigail’s diagnosis of 
squamous cell carcinoma. Id.  
 83. This petition creates the right for a citizen to ask the FDA to “issue, amend, or revoke 
a regulation or order, or to take or refrain from taking any other form of administrative action,” 
argued that there exists a “different risk-benefit tradeoff facing patients who are terminally ill 
and who have no other treatment options,” and that delays in the current regulatory scheme 
prevent many of those who could benefit from experimental drugs from accessing them. 21 
C.F.R. § 10.25 (2015); Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von 
Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 699 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Tier 1 Initial Approval Program 
to Expedite the Availability of Lifesaving Drugs 9 (June 11, 2003)). The petition asked the 
FDA to create new regulations that would allow access to certain drugs after they passed Phase 
I clinical trials. Id.  
 84. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 699–700. Specifically, the FDA noted that the proposed 
regulatory changes “would upset the appropriate balance that [it is] seeking to maintain, by 
giving almost total weight to the goal of early availability and giving little recognition to the 
importance of marketing drugs with reasonable knowledge for patients and physicians of their 
likely clinical benefit and their toxicity." Id. at 700 (quoting Letter from Peter J. Pitts, Associate 
Commissioner for External Relations, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., to Frank Burroughs, 
President, Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs 3 (Apr. 25, 2003)).  
 85. The citizen’s petition was filed under 21 C.F.R. § 10.30, which advises applicants on 
the appropriate formatting, content, and mailing location of their petitions, as well as the 
procedure under which the petition will be reviewed. In this case, as the FDA did not respond to 
the petition in the required 180 days, the Abigail Alliance was entitled to judicial review of their 
petition. See C.F.R. § 10.30(e)(2) (2015). Byron R. Chin, One Last Chance: Abigail Alliance v. 
Von Eschenbach and the Right to Access Experimental Drugs, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1969, 
1973 (2008). 
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In their claim, the Abigail Alliance sued to enjoin the FDA from 
preventing terminally ill patients from accessing drugs that passed 
Phase I testing and claimed that a patient’s “right to life” included the 
right to access potentially life-saving drugs.
86
 The District Court in 
Washington D.C. granted the FDA’s motion to dismiss, claiming that 
no right to access unapproved drugs existed.
87
 On appeal, a three-
judge panel in the D.C. Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the 
lower court’s decision, finding that a fundamental right to access 
post-Phase I drugs existed.
88
 Nevertheless, after the FDA appealed 
for an en banc review, the D.C. Circuit reversed and confirmed that 
no fundamental right to experimental drugs exists.
89
 Though the 
Abigail Alliance appealed the decision, the Supreme Court denied a 
writ of certiorari; thus, as the matter stands, there is currently no 
recognized fundamental right to access drugs before FDA approval.
90
  
Nonetheless, the recent passage in several states of “right to try” 
legislation is evidence that the public’s opinion on access to 
 
 86. Chin, supra note 85, at 1985. The Abigail Alliance found this “right to life” in the Due 
Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which holds that the government cannot deprive 
anyone “of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV. Specifically, the Abigail Alliance relied on Washington v. Glucksberg, 
where the Supreme Court held that “the Due Process Clause specially protects those 
fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
and tradition,’” to argue that this was, indeed, a fundamental right. 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 
(1997); see also Tovanche, supra note 27, at 56. This interest has been compared to the right of 
self-defense, the right to privacy, the doctrine of necessity, interfering with rescue, and the right 
to “refuse life sustaining care.” See Allen J. Jacobs, Is State Power to Protect Health 
Compatible with Substantive Due Process Rights?, 20 ANNALS HEALTH L. 113, 122–23 (2011) 
(emphasis added).  
 87. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. McClellan, 2004 WL 
3777340, at *9 (D.D.C. 2004) (noting that “[t]he court is not persuaded that the plaintiffs seek a 
recognized right”).  
 88. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 445 
F.3d 470. 486 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ; Chin, supra note 85, at 1985. 
 89. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 711. The court wrote: “[W]e conclude that the Alliance 
has not provided evidence of a right to procure and use experimental drugs that is deeply rooted 
in our Nation’s history and traditions. To the contrary, our Nation’s history evidences 
increasing regulation of drugs as both the ability of government to address these risks has 
increased and the risks associated with drugs have become apparent. Similarly, our legal 
traditions of allowing a necessity defense, prohibiting intentional interference with rescue, and 
recognizing a right of self-defense cannot justify creating a constitutional right to assume any 
level of risk without regard to the scientific and medical judgment expressed through the 
clinical testing process.” Id.  
 90. Abigail Alliance For Better Access to Dev. Drug v. Von Eschenbach, 552 U.S. 1159 
(2008).   
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol50/iss1/8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016]  “Right To Try” Legislation 187 
 
 
experimental drugs may be more sympathetic to the terminally ill 
than the D.C. Circuit.
91
 Such laws, currently in place in at least 
twenty-four states and introduced in most others,
92
 allow terminally 
ill patients to petition drug companies for access to experimental 
drugs that have passed Phase I trials without receiving prior approval 
from the FDA.
93
  Generally, a terminally ill patient would need only 
the approval of his or her doctor and a drug company’s agreement to 
sell its product in order to access a potential experimental treatment 
option.
94
 The libertarian think tank behind this legislation, the 
Goldwater Institute, believes that these laws will help dying patients 
obtain potentially life-saving treatments without having to navigate 
the bureaucracy of the FDA and without wasting valuable time in 
accessing drugs.
95
 However, many in the medical community oppose 
these laws; they note that drugs that move past Phase I trials have 
passed a basic safety test to determine a non-lethal dosage but their 
long-term safety, side effects, and effectiveness are, at this stage, 
unknown.
96
 Those in opposition also highlight that many states have 
included clauses shielding medical providers from tort liability for 
 
 91. See Coleman, supra note 16. Not only have these laws received the support of the 
public, but also, they generally pass with heavy bipartisan support in state legislatures. Id. See 
also Arizona Voters Pass ‘Right to Try’ for Terminally Ill, GOLDWATER INSTITUTE (Nov. 5, 
2014), http://goldwaterinstitute.org/article/ arizona-voters-pass-right-try-terminally-ill-patients. 
 92. Right to Try, TENTH AMENDMENT CENTER, http://tracking.tenthamendmentcenter. 
com/issues/right-to-try/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2016). Some examples of state “right to try” laws 
are as follows: COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-45-101 (West 2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§  40:1300.381-1300.386 (2014); MO. ANN. STAT. § 191.480 (West 2014); MICH. ADMIN. 
CODE r. 333.1101 (2015); Arizona Terminal Patients’ Right to Try Referendum, Prop. 303 
(2014); and N.C. GEN.STAT. ANN. § 90-325 (West 2015). See generally Alexander Gaffney, 
“Right to Try” Legislation Tracker, REG. AFF. PROF. SOC’Y (June 24, 2015), http://www.raps. 
org/Regulatory-Focus/News/Databases/2015/06/24/21133/Right-to-Try-Legislation-Tracker/. 
 93. Leonard, supra note 73. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Christina Corieri, Everyone Deserves the Right to Try: Empowering the Terminally Ill 
to Take Control of Their Treatment, GOLDWATER INST. (Feb. 11, 2014) https://goldwater-
media.s3.amazonaws.com/cms_page_media/2015/1/28/Right%20To%20Try.pdf. The Goldwater 
Institute’s model “right to try” legislation describes the right to try an investigational therapy as 
a “fundamental right” and notes that the government should not be involved in making this 
decision for anyone. Id.  
 96. David Gorsky, ‘Right to Try’ Laws and Dallas Buyer’s Club: Great Movie, Terrible 
for Patients and Terrible Policy, SCI. BASED MED. (Mar. 8, 2014), http://www.sciencebased 
medicine.org/right-to-try-laws-and-dallas-buyers-club-great-movie-terrible-public-policy/; John 
Tozzi, supra note 76. See also Rebecca Dresser, The ‘Right to Try’ Investigational Drugs: 
Science and Stories in the Access Debate, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1631, 1632 (2015). 
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aiding patients in accessing drugs and note that this immunity could 
encourage providers to be more liberal in their pursuit of 
experimental drugs than is safe.
97
 Other legal critics claim that if the 
laws were to be challenged in court under constitutional grounds, 
they may be found to be preempted by the federal government’s 
exclusive control over food and drug regulation.
98
 
II. ANALYSIS 
The FDA’s “expanded access” program is currently the only real 
opportunity a terminally ill patient has to access an experimental drug 
if not approved for a clinical trial.
99
 However, the process of getting 
approval is frustrating, time-consuming, and complicated, and even 
when applications are approved, it is often too late for the treatment 
to be effective.
100
 For example, the process as a whole can take 
months to complete, severely limiting the precious time a terminally 
ill patient has to obtain a potentially life-extending or life-saving 
drug.
101
 Moreover, for a patient to benefit from “expanded access,” 
his or her physician must have knowledge of both a current 
experimental drug and the program itself and be willing to guide their 
 
 97. For example, Colorado’s “right to try” law states: 
This article does not create a private cause of action . . . against any other person or 
entity involved in the care of an eligible patient . . . for any harm done to the eligible 
patient resulting from the investigational drug, biological product, or device, so long as 
the manufacturer or other person or entity is complying in good faith with the terms of 
this article, unless there was a failure to exercise reasonable care.  
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-45-107. See also MO. ANN. STAT. § 191.480.2(2)(8). 
 98. Maryland v. Louisiana, notes that in regard to U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, “[i]t is basic to 
this constitutional command that all conflicting state provisions be without effect.” 451 U.S. 
725, 746 (1981); U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. Moreover, Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, stands for the proposition that if the United States has exercised enough power over 
interstate commerce “as to take possession of the field,” states may not add to or take away 
from the United States’ power to regulate. 250 U.S. 566, 569 (1919).  
 99. FAQ: ClinicalTrials.gov—What is "Expanded Access"?, NAT’L INST. HEALTH, 
https://www.nlm.nih.gov/services/ctexpaccess.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2016). 
 100. Cohen, supra note 74; Compassionate Drug Use, CANCER, http://www.cancer.org/ 
treatment/treatmentsandsideeffects/clinicaltrials/compassionate-drug-use, (last visited Jan. 3, 
2016).  
 101. Corieri, supra note 95. 
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patient through the various steps.
102
 The burdens for both patients and 
physicians to comply with the requirements of “expanded access” 
programs suggest that the process is inefficient in its current form. 
At first glance, “right to try” laws, providing a quicker and easier 
method for terminally ill patients to access investigational drugs 
without bureaucratic oversight from the FDA, appear to solve the 
issues discussed above, and all of these laws have passed in state 
legislatures with relatively little or no resistance.
103
 The Goldwater 
Institute and the politicians who put forth these bills argue that 
patients will basically be able to access these drugs anyway through 
expanded access and compassionate use programs but are unduly 
burdened by “bureaucratic red tape” that complicates the process, 
wastes precious time, and violates a patient’s liberty to try to save 
their own life.
104
 In essence, they argue that “right to try” legislation 
is necessary in order to save more lives.
105
 
Nonetheless, these laws create a myriad of problems in the 
medical and legal fields and ultimately do not serve to improve 
terminally ill patients’ odds of benefiting from an experimental drug. 
To begin, these laws are mainly “feel good” laws with no real ability 
to improve access to experimental drugs.
106
 Because drug companies 
are under no obligation to give a patient an experimental drug even if 
the patient receives FDA approval, “right to try” legislation does no 
more to guarantee a patient access to investigational drugs than the 
current laws in place.
107
 In fact, removing the FDA from the process 
 
 102. Jonathan J. Darrow et al., Practical, Legal, and Ethical Issues in Expanded Access to 
Investigational Drugs, 372 N. ENGL. J. MED. 279, 282 (2015). This article explains the heavy 
administrative burden on physicians overseeing a patient’s use of an experimental drug. Id. A 
physician must abide by strict procedures to get informed consent, comply with an institutional 
review board, and record case history, drug disposition, and side effects. Id.  
 103. Not many politicians appear willing to disagree with the concept that everyone has the 
“basic freedom . . . to preserve one’s own life,” as the “right to try” is framed by the Goldwater 
Institute. See Corieri, supra note 95. See also Tozzi, supra note 76. 
 104. Corieri, supra note 95. See also Tozzi, supra note 76; Eleanor Clift, “The Dallas 
Buyer’s Club” Bill, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/ 
03/04/the-dallas-buyers-club-bill.html.  
 105. Tozzi, supra note 76; Corieri, supra note 95.  
 106. Michelle Andrews, More States Adopt Laws to Ease Access to Experimental 
Treatments, NPR (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2014/11/18/364935413/ 
more-states-adopt-laws-to-ease-access-to-experimental-treatments. 
 107. David Kroll, The False Hope of Colorado’s ‘Right to Try’ Investigational Drug Law, 
FORBES (May 19, 2014, 5:26 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidkroll/2014/05/19/the-
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could make drug companies less likely to provide drug samples to 
patients due to the adverse effect the arrangement could have on the 
experimental drug’s approval process, such as patients choosing to 
forego participation in a clinical trial and instead obtain experimental 
drugs on their own.
108
 Because of these limitations, the laws are more 
likely to give terminally ill patients false hope than a cure.
109
 
Furthermore, the Abigail Alliance’s legal pursuit for courts to 
confirm a right to access experimental drugs, as described above, 
raises several concerns with an unfettered system for accessing 
experimental drugs.
110
 First, if a terminally ill patient could access 
experimental drugs simply by requesting them, drug companies 
would have difficulty finding participants for their clinical trials, 
making final approval more costly and time-consuming.
111
 “Right to 
try” laws arose from these perceived faults with the strenuous drug 
approval process, so the fact that they would actually exacerbate the 
process’s problems showcases their fundamental contradiction. 
Second, as the court touched upon in Abigail Alliance, it is a far 
stretch to argue that the right to self-defense includes the right to 
assume risks from drugs.
112
 Experimental drugs have yet to meet 
national public health standards, and administering them this liberally 
could just as easily cause serious harm instead of a cure.
113
 In fact, 
because no particular drug can be said to be safe or effective before 
FDA approval, none can truly offer protection to an individual; 
therefore, the self-defense argument necessarily fails.   
 
false-hope-of-colorados-right-to-try-act/; see also Andrews, supra note 106; Tozzi, supra note 
76. Moreover, pharmaceutical companies are reluctant to sell drugs to individuals without FDA 
approval because any adverse side effects of the drug must be reported in the drug trials, and 
people with terminal illnesses are more likely to have other problems that exacerbate the side 
effects. Id.; Leonard, supra note 73. Even if drug companies do decide to sell an investigational 
drug to a terminally ill patient, insurance companies will probably not cover the expense, 
causing many treatments to only be available to the wealthy. Id. 
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Further complicating the benefits of “right to try” laws is the 
limited liability for physicians who help their patients receive an 
experimental drug, which could serve to undermine the standards of 
the medical profession. Some physicians may use the “right to try” 
laws as a money-making scheme, setting up a practice that 
specializes in acquiring investigational drugs for patients who may 
not truly qualify.
114
 These schemes could influence terminally ill 
patients to forego approved treatments in favor of risky, unproven 
drugs without appropriate advice from their physicians.
115
 Also, the 
relative ease with which patients could acquire investigational drugs 
could lead them to use “right to try” laws for treatment instead of 
enrolling in clinical trials. As noted above, this risk could undermine 
the entire drug approval process, skew results, and increase the time 
and money needed to put a new drug on the market.
116
 
Finally, “right to try” laws are unconstitutional. The federal 
government has been evaluating the safety of drugs since at least 
1902,
117
 and the expansive regulations that it has developed since, 
evidenced by the historical background regarding the expansion of 
the FDA discussed in Section I, demonstrates that it has taken 
“possession of the field” entirely.118 Therefore, federal regulations 
created by the FDA preempt any state laws that attempt to modify its 
requirements, rendering such state laws invalid.
119
 Here, “right to try” 
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laws remove the expanded access procedures developed by the FDA 
from the application process for investigational drugs. In other words, 
these state laws attempt to take control of a process over which the 
federal government has complete control.
120
 Therefore, regardless of 
the policy reasons that weigh against these laws, if one of these laws 
were challenged in court, they very well may be stuck down on 
constitutional grounds.  
III. PROPOSAL 
Although the current “expanded access” program does not 
necessarily serve the needs of all terminally ill patients who seek to 
utilize the program, the “right to try” laws are ultimately ineffective 
in providing more efficient access to experimental drugs and are 
preempted by the FDA’s control over the drug approval process. 
Nevertheless, the fact that so many states have passed similar 
legislation and many more are considering it demonstrates that the 
public finds a speedier, less cumbersome process for experimental 
drug access to be a necessary responsibility of the government.
121
 
Because states themselves cannot constitutionally address this issue 
through regulation, the burden must fall to the FDA. This Note 
recommends that the FDA recognize that the states’ reasoning behind 
passing these laws stems from a genuine fault with the “expanded 
access” program and implement two improvements to its “expanded 
access” program to better serve terminally ill patients’ needs. 
First, the FDA should compile an easily accessible list of 
experimental drugs and their expected treatment uses for potential 
participants in the program. Currently, many of the requirements for 
qualifying for the program, like researching potential clinical trials 
and contacting drug companies about drugs in development, 
unnecessarily burden terminally ill patients.
122
 Moreover, the FDA 
has already accumulated data on all of the drugs that are currently 
under investigation due to the Investigational New Drug 
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Application
123
 requirement and its oversight of clinical trials, so this 
would be a logical next step.
124
 This would streamline the application 
process immensely—applicants could find all relevant information in 
one place and the FDA would have the added benefit of knowing 
where the applicants obtained that information. This system would 
ease the burden on patients from taking numerous proactive measures 
and reduce the frustration, complication, and time needed to meet the 
requirements of the “expanded access” program.  
Second, the FDA should make a concerted effort to educate 
physicians about their role in the “expanded access” process and 
encourage them to have their qualifying patients participate.
125
 
Patients generally rely on their physicians to inform them of all 
potential treatment options, but most physicians have little 
knowledge of specific exceptions to FDA regulations, evidenced by 
the relatively low numbers of participants each year in the “expanded 
access” program.126 Educating physicians on the requirements to 
apply to participate in the program and the responsibilities involved 
in monitoring enrolled patients is mutually beneficial because the 
patients would receive more sound advice about this option earlier in 
the treatment process, and physicians would be better equipped to 
provide support in the enrollment process and in the disposition of an 
experimental drug. Moreover, instruction on the “expanded access” 
program could easily be incorporated into medical school curricula 
and continuing medical education programs for practicing physicians. 
With these two improvements, the FDA would be better able to 
address the needs of the terminally ill while avoiding the 
complications associated with “right to try” legislation. 
CONCLUSION 
The recently popular “right to try” laws reflect states’ modern 
interpretation of Patrick Henry’s most famous words. Proponents of 
these laws believe that, for terminally ill patients, having the freedom 
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to take experimental medications without government interference is 
their only chance for survival. Nevertheless, as this Note 
demonstrates, these laws not only fail to provide the expanded access 
for terminally ill patients to experimental drugs that proponents 
desire, but also suffer from several medical and legal defects that 
complicate their practical application.  
In recognizing that current drug approval procedures, including 
accelerated approval programs, do not adequately serve the 
expediency needs of terminally ill patients, this Note suggests two 
improvements to the current “expanded access” program. The FDA 
should provide patients with the relevant information on current 
experimental drugs, and it should educate physicians on the specific 
requirements of the “expanded access” program, so more terminally 
ill patients will benefit from experimental drugs while preserving the 
federal government’s role in regulating the drug industry. In this way, 
the FDA could incorporate the efficiency of “right to try” laws while 
avoiding the aforementioned defects of this legislation.  
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